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Abstract 
The Growth Enterprise Market ("GEM"), Hong Kong's second board for start-up 
companies, has already been established for more than one year since November 1999. 
However, the success of GEM board is greatly criticized by the investors in terms of 
liquidity and return of investment. This paper studies the performance of the GEM 
market over the first year qualitatively and quantitatively. It is observed that the 
trading patterns of the GEM stocks in terms of intraday mean returns and trading 
volumes are in consistent with the previous findings by researchers. Both of the 
intraday mean returns and trading volumes of the GEM stocks exhibit the U-shaped 
curves (i.e. higher at the beginning and closing of the trading session). 
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The Growth Enterprise Market ("GEM"), Hong Kong's second board for 
start-up companies, has already been established for more than one year since 
November 1999. Although GEM is considered a success by some accounts in 
creating a new stock market catering to technology and high growth companies, 
there hardly seems to be anything else to celebrate in GEM's first-year of existence. 
Given that the number of companies listed on GEM is substantially below target, 
investors' confidence is at a dismal low due to the performance of GEM stocks from 
the collapse of the Internet bubble, and the launch of a PRC second board (also to be 
named the Growth Enterprise Market) even the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
dispensed with any fanfare for GEM's 1st Birthday. As on 31'^  December 2000, 
out of 54 firms listed on the second board, most of the firms traded substantially 
below their issue prices. The success of GEM board is greatly criticized by the 
investors in terms of liquidity and return of investment. The detractors fired GEM 
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heavily for its woeful performance. They argued that GEM is nothing more than a 
waste of space, that the companies listed on it are worth the single-digit stock prices 
they command. On the other hand, some officials argued that the poor 
performance of GEM index (GEI) was attributed to the general bearish sentiment 
towards the technology sector, following an intense rally in the world tech stocks 
that peaked a short time after the GEM was launched. They claimed that the 
performance of the index is a reflection of worldwide corrections rather than an 
indicator of the market quality. Undoubtedly this has created concern among 
market practitioners to the future viability and support the investment community 
will have for GEM. 
This report is going to study the performance of the GEM market over the first 
year qualitatively and quantitatively. This paper would review the GEM's 
performance over the past year and outline the issue GEM faces. 
Background and Features of GEM 
The establishment of Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) is designed to offer 
growth enterprises a speedier way to raise capital in the stock market, enabling them 
to foster and expand their businesses. In fact, these companies would take a much 
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longer time to be listed on the main board as most of them do not fulfil the 
profitability/track record requirements of the existing listing rules. While a 
company seeking a listing on the main board must have a three-year track record and 
show profits of at least HK$ 50 million over that period, GEM allows companies 
that have been in business for as short as two years and have no profits to list. In 
addition, GEM can offer investors an alternative of investing in "high growth, high 
risk" businesses. In light of the high-risk nature of the GEM board, GEM bills 
itself as the "Buyers-Beware Market for Informed Investors". It operates on the 
philosophy of “let the market decide" and "buyers beware". Based on the “let the 
market decide" philosophy, GEM requires a strong (i.e. more frequent and timely) 
disclosure regime such as to make half yearly disclosure of its business progress, to 
publish quarterly accounts and to make half-year comparison with listing plan. On 
the basis of “buyers beware", GEM intends to make investors fully aware of the 
risks associated with investing in high-risk stocks. 
Besides, GEM's founders tried to avoid labeling it a high-tech exchange 
though most of the stocks listed on the exchange are technology or internet-related. 
GEM is emerging simply as a market with different rules from the main board. 
Companies that feel they are too small for the main board could conceivably choose 
GEM as long as they are willing to accept its higher disclosure standards. 
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Features of Small Cap Companies 
The performance of small cap companies tends to be more volatile than large 
cap companies. Since most small cap companies depend on one or few products to 
generate sales and their financial position are less capitalized, any downturn in their 
markets could have an adverse impact on their profitability. Further, these small cap 
companies are mostly in "emerging" industries, the development of such industries to 
established markets could take several or many years to achieve, or could never get 
there at the end. 
In the case of IPOs, the exciting growth stories of small cap companies tend to 
create strong investors' interests in the share offer. For many investors, the 
investment strategy in small cap IPOs is "flipping", whereby investors subscribe for 
the shares at IPO price, ride the surge in stock price during the first few days after 
the company's floatation, and sell off when the stock price looks as if it hits its 
opening peak. In many cases, after reaching its peak, the stock price would come 
down significantly as the excitement of the growth story subsides. The company's 
stock price could hover at certain levels for quite a while as the growth story might 
take a long time to materialize. 
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Market Statistics 
Up to December 2000, GEM has 54 listed companies that raised a total of 
approximately HK$16.4 billion. GEM has a market cap of about HK$67 billion 
based on December 31 2000 closing prices. Average monthly turnover was around 
HK$3 billion, except for March and August, which were at HK$33 billion and 
HK$11 billion respectively. Of the 54 companies, only 14, or 25% of them were 
traded above their IPO prices at the end of 2000. Wah Sang Gas (8035), an old 
economy player, has become the biggest gainer, rising 396% above its IPO price 
since listing. AcrossAsia (8061) is the largest GEM company, accounting for 24% 
of the total market cap, followed by Phoenix TV (8002) at 16% and Tom.com (8001) 
accounting for 10%. 
Number of IPO in the Market 
During the past year, the GEM board did well initially by attracting 10 new 
listings in its first 3 months. The number of IPOs surged to peak in March due to 
the run-up in U.S tech stocks and the Internet frenzy created by the listings of 
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Tom.com (8001) and Sunevision (8008). There were 6 IPOs listed in March alone. 
With the global correction of tech stocks kicking in, the IPO market slowed down to 
only 7 new listings in April and May. From June to August, the IPO market picked 
up significantly due to the pent up number of new listings that were delayed in 
previous months. In these three months, 20 IPOs were listed. The IPO market 
later lost its momentum in September and October, with only 4 IPOs listed in this 
period. The worst month for new GEM listings is November as there was not a 
single IPO in that month. Expected in Novemeber, Jitong Communications, the 
first PRC telecom operator to be listed on GEM, has postponed its listing 
indefinitely. I-Quest, a provider of Internet access to hotels, has secured private 
equity funding instead of going for a GEM listing. In the last month, December, 
there were 5 new listings as a mark for the end of year 2000. 
IPO Fund Raised in the Market 
From November 1999 to December 2000, the GEM board raised a fund of 
approximately HK$ 16.4 billion in total for the listed firms. The amount of fund 
raised surged to peak in March. It amounted to about $ 6.7 billion that accounted 
for 40% of the total fund raised in fourteen months. On one hand, the run-up in 
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U.S tech stocks and the Internet frenzy created by the listings of Tom.com (8001) 
and Sunevision (8008) has stirred up investors' interest. On the other hand, the 
tech fever during that period boosted the valuation on tech stocks to an ever-high 
level. The strong market atmosphere recorded huge fund raised in March 2000. 
The second month for largest amount of fund raised fell to July 2000. With 12 
IPOs in a month, it raised approximately HK$ 3.2 billion, equivalent to about 20% 
of fund raised between November 1999 and December 2000. The IPO market 
picked up significantly due to the pent up number of new listings that were delayed 
in previous months. Moreover, another blue-chip back-up company, Henderson 
Cyber Ltd, which is backed by Henderson Holdings, raised by nearly HK$ 1 billion. 
The remaining 40% of fund raised through the other twelve months with an average 
of only approximately HK$ 0.5 billion per month. 
IPO Fund Raised by Type 
The companies can raise fund from the GEM market by three methods: open 
offer to general public for subscription, offer to institutional investors for placing or 
sales. Among the IPO fund raised in the GEM market, about 92% of the funds 
were raised through offer for placement. Moreover, out of 54 listed firms, 3 5 firms 
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were listed through pure placement issue instead of including a public offer. It may 
reflect the level of general public's participation in the GEM market. It seems that 
GEM is a pool for the private party to game on in the initial public offering process. 
Most of the offering shares were allocated to a small number of institutional 
investors. For instance, Digitalhongkong.com disclosed that of the 25.2 million 
shares issued under the placing, 97% of which are held by 6 shareholders, and the 
remaining 3% of shares under the placing are held by 56 shareholders. Also, the 
real prices of the shares are doubtful because there may be private agreement among 
different stakeholders that could lead to manipulation of share price. Institutional 
investors take a huge proportion of capital raised in the fund raising process. 
Therefore, the activities of institutional investors will also determine the 
performance of future GEM deals. If the institutional investors actively sell the 
shares from the first day of trading, the market confidence will be hampered. 
Business Nature of Listed Firms 
Among 54 listed firms by end 2000, near 80% of the total funds raised went to 
technology companies involved in the Internet and other IT-related businesses. 
The technology boom and existence of GEM have prompted many Old Economy 
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firms on the main board launching their own hi-tech initiatives in fear of losing 
investors interests. Out of 54 firms, there are 30 IT-related firms (55%), 10 other 
hi-tech firms (19%) and 14 other firms (26%). 
Performance of GEM Market in Terms of GEI 
The Growth Enterprise Index (GEI) was introduced by the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong on March 20, 2000 to provide investors with a benchmark indicator to 
access the movement of the Growth Enterprise Market. The base value of GEI was 
1000 index points with reference to the closing prices of March 17, 2000. GEI 
includes all GEM stocks and is weighted according to each company's market 
capitalization. Since its establishment, GEI has shown a continuous decreasing 
trend over the year. In the first half of the year, 25 firms listed on the exchange had 
given risk hungry investors the opportunity to buy hi-tech stocks that never would 
have seen the light of day on the main board. However, the market experienced a 
tough time in the second half of the year. By the end of 2000, the GEI dropped by 
70 percent to 309 points. The GEI performance was far worse than that of Hang 
Seng Index and the Hang Seng IT Index. Hang Seng Index dropped from 17,082 
to 15,095 points (i.e. 12% only) and Hang Seng IT Index dropped from 3,457 to 
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1,688 points (i.e. 51%) over the period (from March 20, 2000 to December 29, 
2000). Hang Seng IT Index is used for comparison as the businesses of more than 
70% of the GEM stocks are IT-related. 
GEM Corporate Governance 
The Growth Enterprise Market requires GEM companies to develop a strong 
corporate compliance with the GEM listing rules and raise the standard of internal 
control in the GEM companies to ensure their businesses are managed and operated 
in the best interest of the minority shareholders. Since directors are responsible for 
the management and operation of a company, any breach of the GEM listing rules 
by the directors of some GEM companies highlight the lack of strong corporate 
governance within the companies involved. 
Two GEM Listing Rules Non-compliance Cases to Date 
From the announcements made by the GEM companies, there have been two 
reports of non-compliance to GEM listing rules since GEM commenced trading in 
late 1999. In April of 2000, a director ofhongkong.com (8006) dealt in one million 
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shares of the company within the month that the company was due to release its 
quarterly results announcement. Another case was happened in August of 2000. A 
director of hkcyber.com (8118) dealt in 100,000 shares of the company during the 
one-month before the release of the company's quarterly results. 
The above companies breached Rule 5.51 of GEM listing rules, which prohibits 
a director of a GEM company to enter into any dealings of the company's shares 
during a one-month period immediately prior to the publication of the company's 
results or quarterly reports. The rule however allows the director to do so under 
exceptional conditions. For instance, in April 2000, Wah Sang Gas (8035) 
announced that it may involve a possible breach of GEM listing rules due to the 
company's failure to make earlier public announcement on the signing of a joint 
venture agreement in relation to a gas project in the PRC. 
Other Controversy Issues of GEM 
There are a number of controversy issues regarding GEM since its inception. 
Selective waivers by tom.com 
With blue-chip conglomerate parents of Hutchison Whampoa and Cheung 
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Kong, tom.com Limited won waivers on listing rules regarding management 
shareholders moratorium, active business pursuits and share options provisions 
because, as explained jointly by the SFC and SEHK, the grant of these waivers 
helped develop the GEM and compete with other markets. Later, hongkong.com 
and SUNeVision, with parent of china.com and Sun Hung Kai Properties 
respectively, followed and granted similar relaxation on their listing. These have 
led to public concerns regarding the lack of transparency associated with such 
waivers. 
General relaxation of listing rules 
There was an overall relaxation of listing rules four months after the launch of 
GEM. At 11th March 2000, the SFC and SEHK jointly announced listing reviews 
in responding to public concerns on a number of individual wavier cases. Major 
amendments included firstly the reduction of "lock-up" period of initial management 
shareholders moratorium from two years to six months. Secondly, they rcducc 
"active business pursuits" period from two years to at least twelve months. Thirdly, 
they also increase of share options upper limit from ten percent to thirty percent of 
issuer's share capital. The intention of relaxation was said to ensure the success 
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and competitiveness of GEM, and to ensure a level playing field and transparency in 
the application of the GEM Rules. 
Property acquisition by Timeless Software 
As an information technology company, Timeless Software acquired a luxury 
79th floor office at Central from construction developer Cheong Kong for HK$178 
million. The company raised HK$450 million from the IPO and used nearly 40 
percent of the proceeds for the spending on property. It was commented that the 
acquisition was not clearly indicated in the listing documents and was over-priced. 
The management of Timeless Software argued that such transaction would secure 
the company's business from Cheong Kong. 
Errors made by GEM companies 
Directors have obligation to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the 
information contained in all announcements released by their companies. During 
the year 2000, a number of companies have made errors in their announcements or 
annual reports. CyberM International made an error on the subscription rate of the 
share placing in the announcement of allotment results. A discrepancy was found 
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on the number of share options granted to two independent non-executive directors 
in the 2000 interim report published by techpacific.com. Shanghai Fudan made 
errors in its 2000 interim results announcements. HKcyber.com made an error on 
the number of shares placed to its full-time employee. The current liabilities 
disclosed in the Chinese version of ePRO 2000 annual report should have been 
HK$ 180 million instead of HK$ 118 million. These have raised public concerns on 
the accuracy and reliability of information contained in the announcements of GEM 
companies that could affect the decision of investors. 
Excessive valuation 
The valuation of high technology growth enterprises, especially the Internet 
companies, was a hot topic during the year 2000. Some GEM companies were 
criticized for overvaluation at their subscription. For example, with the 
emphasized warning by the director of 36.com that the company may never have 
profit, its subscription price per share of HK$0.36 was six times more than the net 
worth per share of HK$0.06. Another Internet content provider - CyberM 
International, its subscription price per share was also almost five times more than 
its net worth per share. 
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Quality of listed company 
When GEM was established, it targeted there would be 100 listed companies 
in one year. Although there were only 49 companies a year later, there was a 
concern that the GEM Listing Committee would focus on the quantity of listings 
rather than on the quality. 
Undisclosed holdings of Panda-Recruit 
Lo Ka Shui, who is both the chairman of Panda-Recruit and chairman of the 
GEM Listing Committee, was discovered that there were undisclosed related parties 
holdings of the GEM company. His brother Vincent Lo was not considered as an 
independent third party to Panda-Recruit hold effectively 23.54% of the company. 





Investors who trade stocks are competing with professional traders and 
institutional investment managers, and to be competitive, investors must be aware of 
the influences that other traders have on market returns. Researchers have 
identified a number of regularities in common stock returns. The availability of the 
intra-day stock price data has generated a considerable amount of empirical research 
that offers a further insight in understanding the price behaviour over the course of 
the trading day. The well-documented pattern of stock returns during the average 
trading day shows a repeated occurrence of higher-than-expected returns at the open 
and close of the market and lower returns during the middle of the day. The 
literature refers to the observed return regularity as the "U-shaped pattern of intraday 
returns". The pattern has been identified in a number of studies including work by 
Harris(1986), Jain and Joh (1988) and Mclnish and Wood (1990). A similar 
pattern (high early and late in the day, low during the middle hours) applies to 
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trading volume (Jain and Joh, 1988), return variance (Wei, 1992), and bid-ask 
spreads (Mclnish, and Wood, 1992). The values for these variables during market 
opening and closing times are distinctly larger than the mid-day values. 
Harris (1986) employed transaction-by-transaction data for the fourteen 
months from December 1981 to January 1983 for all New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) stocks. He reported that the returns are different across different hours of 
the day. There are significant weekday differences in intraday returns in the first 
45 minutes of trading. On Monday, returns are negative, while on other weekdays, 
returns in this interval are positive. Besides, the systematic intraday return patterns 
are common to all of the weekdays. Returns are very large at the beginning and at 
the end of the trading day. The mean returns over this trading interval are between 
five and ten times as large as returns accruing later in the day. The 
beginning-of-day returns accrue over several transactions. The large positive 
end-of-day returns accrue only on the last transaction of the day. 
Jain and Joh (1988) provided evidence on joint characteristics of hourly 
common stock trading volume on New York Stock Exchange and returns on the 
Standard and Poor's 500 index for the years between 1979 and 1983. The results 
showed that the average trading volume traded shows significant differences across 
six trading hours of the day, and. to some extent, across days of the week. Average 
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volume is highest during the first hour, declines monotonically until the fourth hour, 
but increases again on the fifth and the sixth hours. The average volumes across 
days of the week (for each hour) are significantly different. Average daily trading 
volume is lowest on Monday, increases monotonically from Monday to Wednesday, 
and then declines monotonically on Thursday and Friday. On the other hand, the 
common stock returns differ across trading hours of the day. On average, largest 
stock returns occur during the first (except on Monday) and the last trading hours. 
The lowest average return is earned in the fifth hour of the day. Many of the details 
of the day of the week and the hour of the day effects documented by earlier 
researchers are generalized over a longer period in the study. In particular, average 
stock returns are significantly negative only during the first hour of Monday. 
Moreover, there is a strong contemporaneous relation between trading volume and 
returns and also a relation between trading volume and returns lagged up to four 
hours. Furthermore, the trading volume-returns relation is steeper for positive 
returns than for nonpositive returns. 
Harris (1989) observed a significantly large average price change on the last 
daily NYSE transaction (the day-end effect) and concluded that the phenomenon 
was pervasive over most firms and days. And it concludes that the day-end effect 
is caused by an increase in the frequency of ask prices at the day-end. However, 
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Harris can't explain the reason the last trade is more often initiated by the buyer. 
Miller (1989) argues that this day-end effect is caused by the trading 
mechanism of the UK market. The NYSE is a continuous market where specialists 
and dealers act as market-makers. One of the important obligations of the 
specialist is to maintain price continuity throughout the trading day. They are 
required to set opening prices near the previous day's close, preventing large price 
changes between closing and opening�Specia l is ts must know the rational public 
response to their duty to maintain continuity. A rational response for them is to 
raise the closing price so that they are less often forced to unfavaourable opening 
trades. Miller suggests that the day-end effect is caused by the specialists who set a 
relatively high price at the last trade to defend their position when the market is open 
on the next trading day. 
There is another body of literature studying the weekly trading pattern of the 
stock market. A lot of evidence describes the phenomenon that stock returns 
appear to depend on the day of the week. The weekend effect stock return anomaly 
is typically defined as the occurrence of negative returns on Mondays. This 
anomaly has a long history for decades. Since French (1980) originally observed 
that stock returns are higher than average on the last trading day of the week and 
lower than average on the first, many researchers have attempted to explain what has 
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come to be known as the "weekend" or "day-of-the-week" effect. The pattern 
applies to both the developed markets and smaller emerging markets. Gibbons and 
Hess (1981) confirmed French's findings using the same Standard and Poor's 500 
Stock (SP 500) index. These findings were further supported by Lakonishok and 
Levi (1982), Harris (1986) and Smirlock and Starts (1986) who independently 
analyzed the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index over different time periods. 
All of them reached similar conclusions. The daily effects are hard to explain with 
the assumption of an efficient market. Those aware of the intra-week effect should 
be able to derive the trading strategies to produce superior returns over the weekend. 
On the other hand, those aware of the intra-week effect should have adjusted the 
timing of their buying and selling to take advantage of the effect. Even if not all 
investors are aware of the intra-week effect, professional traders trading against the 
effect could in theory eliminate them. However, this seasonal effect has been 
documented by many researchers. This can be explained by the transaction cost 
involved in buying and selling the stocks. The overnight return may not be large 
enough to cover the transaction cost incurred. 
Chow, Hsiao and Solt (1997) reported that the weekend effect can be 
exploited to generate positive trading returns under the right circumstances. Under 
the Sorting Strategy, trades should only be made when Friday's prior return is below 
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a cut-off value somewhere between —0.7 percent to — 1 percent. The time on 
Friday when prior returns are measured and trading is initiated is part of the 'right' 
circumstances, and the best time to implement weekend trading is late Friday 
afternoon. The major issued raised by Chow, Hsiao and Solt is that apart from 
‘Monday morning effect', a 'Friday afternoon effect' is also at work. The 
identified trading strategy can generate profit exceeding transactions costs. 
Moreover, Smirlock and Starks (1986) and Yadav and Pope (1992) have 
reported that the negative Monday returns are caused by the active trading period 
during the morning session for the US market and UK market respectively. 
Meanwhile, there has been a rising interest in the examining the weekly seasonal 
pattern of the smaller Asian stock markets. Similar weekly pattern for the Japanese 
market is found by Jaffe and Westerfield (1985b) and Kato and Schallheim (1985). 
The weekly seasonal pattern is also documented in some Asian markets. Ho (1990) 
reported a unique intra-week seasonal pattern for Asia-Pacific stock markets: 
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Negative Tuesday returns and positive Friday 
returns are found. However, it find hard to reject the hypothesis that 
day-of-the-week variations of Asia Pacific markets are similar too that of the U.S. 
market after adjustments for time zone differences, especially for smaller market. 
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Because of the unavailability of data, most of the intra-daily studies are 
restricted to the US market only. Ho and Chueng's (1991) work is the first 
intra-daily study of the Hong Kong market. They report a more intra-week and 
intra-day variations in the post-crash period than in the pre-crash period. Cheung 
(1995) has further examined the behaviour of the intra-daily stock return of the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) from April 1986 to December 1990 with 
15-minute interval data of the Hang Seng Index. The study showed a significant 
intra-day variation in the middle of the week with negative mean returns in the 
Monday morning session. Cheung's findings confirmed that the phenomenon of 
day-end effect also exists for both another exchange and another country and are not 
due to peculiarities of the US securities markets. It has refuted Miller's argument 
that that it is in the interest of specialists to set a relatively high price at the last trade 
so as to defend their position when the market is open on the next day. This is 
because Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) is a continuous market but without 
a specialist trading system. Cheung also found that the day-end returns are 
negatively correlated with the opening returns of the following day. The study 
evidenced that the large and positive day-end returns are corrected by the market at 
the opening transaction of the next trading day. Cheung suggested that the 
phenomenon may be caused by the fund managers who want to bid up the closing 
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prices so as to increase the mutual fund net asset value since the mutual fund net 
asset values are computed with stock closing prices. He commented that the 
institutional investors have a heavy influence in the Hong Kong stock market. 
Cheung has also shown that there no simple trading rule can be adopted to obtain a 
arbitrage profit by buying and selling stocks at a particular time since the significant 
fall in price on Monday of 0.21% cannot compensate for the round trip transactions 
costs of about 1% in Hong Kong. 
While the financial researchers find that the day-of-the-week effects exists in 
both the U.S. and international stock markets, they disagree on whether the effect is 
due to the trading activities of individual or institutional investors. Abraham and 
Ikenberry (1994) conclude that individual investors are responsible for the 
day-of-the-week effect in the U.S. stock market with the argument that individual 
investors are more active sellers of stock on Mondays than on any other weekday. 
The individuals exert substantially greater selling pressure on Mondays following 
negative returns in prior trading sessions. Using intraday S&P 500 index returns, it 
is found that most of the selling pressure occurs before 11:00 am Monday morning. 
However, Sias and Starks (1995) believe thai institutional investors cause the effect. 
It reported that stocks with large institutional holdings demonstrate significantly 
greater turnover seasonality than comparable-sized stocks held primarily by 
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individual investors. Furthermore, stocks with higher institutional holdings 
demonstrate significantly greater day-of-the-week conditional return patterns than 
do held primarily by individual investors. For weeks following positive Fridays, 
stocks with higher institutional holdings have significantly greater Monday returns 
than do stocks with lower institutional holdings. Wang and Walker (2000) have 
examined the pattern of daily stock returns in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan for 
studying the role of individual and institutional investors playing in explaining the 
daily return patterns. The results revealed that institutional investors (Japan), 
individual investors (Taiwan), or both (Hong Kong) can cause these patterns. The 
findings are consistent with the relative importance of institutional and individual 
investors in each of these markets. 
Most of the studies on the intra-day and weekly pattern in stock returns and 
trading volume are concentrated on the well-established market. It may be 
interesting to examine if the similar pattern can be found in the small emerging 
market that is only set up for a short time. In this paper, the trading pattern of 
stocks in Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market for the period from April 3, 2000 to 
December 31, 2000 will be studied to exploit if any trading strategy can be exploited 
to gain profit by trading rule on intraday or weekly trading pattern. In particular, 
we are to compare the trading pattern of the GEM market and see if they exhibit 
25 
similar regularities as documented in the literature. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The GEM market, the second board listed under the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK), opens at 10:00 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. for a lunch break of two hours 
and from 2:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. The GEM market is a continuous market with no 
market professional, such as a specialist, to intervene in trading. The trading 
system of the Exchange is an-order driven system. Trading is conducted through 
terminals in the Trading Hall of the Exchange or through the off-floor trading 
devices at Exchange Participants' offices. After the full implementation of 
AMS/3, depending on the type of trading facility used by the Exchange Participants, 
investors can place orders via various channels to their brokers. Exchange 
Participants can choose among Trading Terminals, Multi-Workstation System and 
Broker Supplied System as their trading facilities. 
Quotations for buy and sell orders are governed by another set of quotation 
rules and a scale of spreads. The first bid or ask order entered into the trading 
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system on each trading day is governed by the opening quotation rule. The first 
order, whether it is a bid or ask，shall not in any case deviate nine times or more 
from the previous closing price. Quotations for buy and sell orders other than the 
opening quotations are governed by rule that a buy order or a sell order shall not be 
made at a price that deviates nine times or more from the nominal price. 
In summaiy, trading on the SEHK is performed through the terminals at floor 
traders or off-floor trading devices at Exchange Participants' offices. They do not 
have the obligation to stabilize prices and supply liquidity to the market. The floor 
traders do not take any position in the stock transactions. They do not buy or sell 
stocks in order to ensure price continuity and stability, nor do they have the duty to 
do so. 
Data Description 
The sample period is April 3, 2000 through December 31, 2000. April 3, 
2000 is chosen as the starting date for the study because of the following reasons. 
The GEM index has been introduced since March 17, 2000. The GEM index 
provides investors with a benchmark indicator to access the movement of the GEM 
and allows investors to measure the overall performance of GEM in a more efficient 
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manner. It supports the argument that the GEM market is more well-developed and 
the number of listed stocks can better reflect the market performance in general. 
Moreover, April 3, 2000 is chosen instead of March 17, 2000 in order to avoid the 
initial trading effect of the huge capitalized stock Sunevision Holdings Ltd. (8008) 
which was listed on March 17, 2000. In order to maintain the consistency of the 
data for study, only the eighteen stocks listed before April 3, 2000 are included for 
the study. Table 1 shows the list of listed stocks included in the study: 
TABLE 1 
A LIST OF GEM STOCKS IN OUR STUDY 
— k C o d e ICompanies j L i s O T ^ t ^ 
謝 1 China Agrotech Holdings Ltd. 1999/11/25 
卯28 Timeless Software Ltd. ‘~1999/11/25 
謝 3 Pine Technology Holdings Ltd. — 1999/11/26 
謝 8 SIIC Medical Science and Technology (Group )T^ 1999/12/02 
• 3 TS Telecom Technologies Ltd. “ 1999/12/02 
腿 5 Asian Information Resources (Holdings) Ltd. — 1999/12/16 
謝 5 Qianlong Technology International Holdings U d T 1999/12/17 
謝 6 China Data Broadcasting Holdings Ltd. 2000/01/24 
謝 2 Far Eastern Polychem Industries LtdT" 2000/01/31 
勘 5 Yuxing InfoTech Holdings Ltd. 一 2000/01/31 
綱 Q Fortune Telecom Holdings Ltd. 一 2000/02/16 
膨 3 Vodatel Networks Holdings Ltd. 2000/02/25 
勤 1 tom.com Limited ‘ 2000/03/01 
卿 6 hongkong.com Corporation 2000/03/09 
8035 Wah Sang Gas Holdings Ltd. — 2000/03/16 
• 8 Sunevision Holdings Ltd. “ 2000/03/17 
8026 Prosten Technology Holdings Ltd. 2000/03/28 
8009 liMerchants Ltd. 一 2000/03/31 
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The 15-mintue interval data of stock prices and trading volumes for the GEM 
stocks are obtained from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They consist of 
sixteen 15-minute observations over the intervals 10:15 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. and from 
2:45 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 
All stock returns (Rt) are computed as natural logarithmic price relatives: 
R t= ln (Pt/Pt-i)* 100% 
Pt = share price at time t 
Pt-i = share price at time t-1 
18 
Average return of the eighteen stocks is AR.=上^  
18 
All stock trading volume (TSt) are normalized by the corresponding 
outstanding shares issued as below: 
T S t = ( V t - V t . i ) / O S * 100% 
TSt = percentage of shares traded in terms of outstanding shares 
issued during the period between t and t-1. 
Vt = no. of shares traded up to time t 
Vt-i = no. of shares traded up to time t-1 
OS = no. of outstanding shares issued during the period 
18 
Y T S u 
Average size of trading volume of the eighteen stocks is ATSt = ^^ ^ ' 
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For each trading day, fifteen 15-minute returns and normalized trading volumes 
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are computed in the following sequence: 10:15 a.m., 10:30 a.m., 10:45 a.m., 1 】：00 
a.m., 11:30 a.m., 12:00 a.m., 12:15 p.m., 12:30 p.m., 3:00 p.m., 3:15 p.m., 3:30 p.m., 
3:45 p.m., 4:00 p.m. The Noon return and trading volume series, i.e. returns and 
trading volumes incurred during the period 12:30 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. are also 
computed. In the subsequent analysis, each of the series is referred to by its time, 




Intraday and Weekly Stock Returns 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the 15-minute returns by trading 
time for the overall period. Negative returns are observed for most of the intervals 
(from 10:15 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) except the last two intervals (3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.). 
The day-end returns are large and positive (0.43 %). 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION BY TRADING 
TIME FOR THE PERIOD 
Time-interval Mean St. Dev. 
10:15 -0.06% 1.34% 
10:30 -0.03% 0.46% 
10:45 -0.04% ~~ 0.41% 
11:00 -0.13% 0.32% 
11:15 -0.06% 0.36% 
11:30 -0.10% 0.36% 
11:45 -0.07% 0.30% 
12:00 -0.09% 0.30% 
12:15 -0.08% 0.26% 
12:30 -0.02% 0.32% 
14:45 -0.10% 0.39% 
15:00 -0.10% 0.32% 
15:15 -0.06% ~ ~ 0.34% 
15:30 -0.08% 0.34% 
15:45 0.01% 0.38% 
16:00 0.43% 0.49% 
A number of analyses of variance tests were performed to assess the mean 
returns across 15-minute intervals for each day and across days of the week. The 
results of these F-tests are also presented in Table 3. The F-1 column contains the 
F-statistic for testing the equality of returns across all weekdays. We find that there 
are some intra-week variations for the period. There are significantly intra-week 
variations for 11:00 a.m., 12:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. However, no explanation can 
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be concluded for the finding that the mean return of the stocks is a function of the 
day of the week for these three time intervals. This may just be a co-incident 
situation because the mean return of the stocks is not a function of the day of the 
week for the remaining time intervals. 
Row F-2 contains the F-statistic for testing the equality of all intra-day returns. 
Interestingly, the findings show that there are significant intra-day variations for 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. It indicates that the mean return of the 
stocks is a function of the time of the day. It supports the previous findings by 
other researchers that the negative morning returns at the beginning of the trading 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 ： The Mean 15-minute Returns by Trading Time (April 3, 2000 - December 31，2000) 
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Figure 1 displays the movements of the 15-minute returns. The graph 
indicates that there is a general increasing trend from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. 
(morning session closing time) and also a spike in stock return at the end of the 
trading day. As shown in Figure 2, the magnitudes of the standard deviations follow 
a U-shape curve for each trading session, higher at the beginning and at the close of 
the trading session. This finding is consistent with those obtained for the UK market 
by Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) and Lockwood and Linn (1990), and HK main 
broad market by Cheung (1995). 
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Intraday Trading Volume 
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations of trading volume for each 
day of the week and 15-minute interval of the day. On average, 0.0107 percent of 
shares outstanding of the eighteen stocks change hands every 15 minute. A number 
of observations can be made from Table 4. Average trading volume is highest 
(0.0233 %) during the last 15 minute of the day for each day of the week. The 
average last 15 minute trading volume is at least 50 percent more than the average 15 
minute trading volume during the day. The second highest trading volume falls to 
the first 15-minute interval of the day for each day of the week. The average trading 
volume declines monotonically until 12:30 p.m. but increases again at the 15 minute 
interval between 2:30 p.m. and 2:45 p.m. (the beginning 15 minute interval of the 
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afternoon session). The trading volume shows a continual increasing trend until the 
last 15-minute interval of the day. Higher volumes may occur during the first 
15-minute interval because investors transact on information gathered during the night 
and in the morning before the market opens. Besides, volume increases prior to the 
end of the day may reflect investors closing or hedging open positions that they 
cannot monitor or change overnight. Nevertheless, among all intervals of the week, 
the trading volume is highest during the last 15-minute of Friday. It further supports 
the argument that the investors close or hedge open positions that they cannot monitor 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Mean 15-minute trading volume by trading time (April 3, 2000- December 29, 2000) 
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Trading time of the day 
A number of analyses of variance tests were performed to assess the mean 
trading volume across 15-minute intervals for each day and across days of the week. 
The results of these F-tests are also presented in Table 3. The F-1 column contains 
the F-statistic for testing whether the mean trading volumes across the days for each 
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15-minute interval are the same. Most of F-1 values are small that there is no 
intra-week variation in the mean trading volumes. On the other hand, row F-2 
contains the F-statistic for testing the equality of all intra-day trading volumes. All 
F-2 statistics values are large, indicating that the average trading volumes across 
15-minute intervals are different at the 1 percent level of significance for each day. 
In sum, these results clearly indicate that mean trading volume is a function of the 
time of the day but independent on the day of the week. 
Figure 3 presents the mean 15-minute trading volume by trading time while 
Figure 4 pointed out the mean 15-minute trading volume for each weekday. And 
they show the trading volume follows a U-Shape pattern. 
Discussing Conclusion for Quantitative Studies 
Our study generally showed that the intra-week stock return and trading volume 
were generally consistent with pervious research findings. Stock returns of GEM 
were consistent with the U-share pattern, although it was not clear in the morning 
session. Also, day-end returns and the opening returns of the next trading session 
were negatively correlated. For trading volume, our results are in line with the 
U-share pattern both in the morning and afternoon session. 
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CHAPTER V 
QUALITATIVE STUDY OF GEM MARKET 
The factors contributed to the weak performance on GEM's tech stocks and the 
main issues faced by the current GEM market are discussed in the following pages. 
Factors Contributed to the Prevailing Weak Sentiment on GEM 
Blue-chip Backing 
Investors' interest in tech stocks faded away due to lack of high profile IPOs 
like Tom.com and Sunevision. In March of this year, investors' euphoric demand for 
tech stocks was partly the result of the listing of three large GEM tech companies, 
namely Tom.com, Sunevision and Hongkong.com. The attraction came from the 
large size of their offering relative to other GEM issues at the time. A larger issue 
size gave this stock greater potential liquidity. In addition, these issues were backed 
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by prominent blue-chip companies, such as Cheung Kong in the case of Tom.com and 
Sun Hung Kai Properties in the case of Sunevision. With such positive atmosphere 
created, investors went into the stocks and those who knew very little about the 
businesses of Tom.com or Sunevision also joined the crowd, not wanting to miss the 
bandwagon. Prices of Tom.com shares surged 445% to a high of $9.70 on debut, 
Sunevision went up 68% to a high of $17.45, and Hongkong.com jumped 384% to a 
high of $9.10. The tech companies listed after them were comparatively smaller in 
size and did not have quality backers to measure up with Tom.com or Sunevision. 
Investors' interest in tech companies faded away and the later listed tech companies 
failed to draw strong buying interests. In this case, investors who do not understand 
the tech sectors were investing in these new GEM listing based on the potential share 
price support blue chip companies would provide for their new technology arms. 
Mega-dollar Tech Deals Sent Tech Stocks to Higher Levels 
Valuation on tech stocks went up too quickly too soon, so profit-taking was 
inevitable. Early 2000, the global stock market sentiment was buoyed by several 
mega-dollar Internet merger and acquisition deals such as the AOL merger with Time 
Warner in January, and locally, the takeover by Pacific Century CyberWorks of Cable 
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& Wireless HKT in February. In many of these mega-dollar deals, the financing 
involved share swaps, for instance, the share option proposed by Pacific Century 
CyberWorks in its takeover bid of Cable & Wireless HKT. The intrinsic valuation of 
the shares involved in the deal went up dramatically over a very short period of time, 
attracting many investors to go into the market in anticipation of hefty capital gains on 
the tech shares they bought. This sent tech stock prices to higher levels. In March 
2000, the excitement cooled down noticeably, with less hot merger and acquisition 
deals announced in the market. Profit-taking on tech stocks started to kick in and at 
the same time there was a shift of funds from the tech stocks to "Old Economy" 
stocks. As a result, tech stocks on Nasdaq experienced a price correction. This 
coupled with the sharp decline in Japanese tech stocks triggered major sell-offs in 
tech stocks on GEM and the main-board. 
Understanding on Issuer's Business is Key 
It appears to be a general lack of good understanding of some of OEM's tech 
companies by investors. Companies listed on the main-board have made profits and 
their businesses have established a certain track record in the industries where they 
operate. On GEM, however, most tech companies have not made any profits prior to 
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listing and their businesses are tend to be more volatile than the main-board listed 
companies. Many investors are finding it difficult to understand the tech business of 
some GEM companies, especially those who are involved in the business of providing 
Internet platforms or offering total solution services. While everyone seems to know 
that Tom.com is connected with Cheung Kong or Mr. Li Ka-shing, not many of them 
know what Tom.com is doing and how it intends makes money or in the case of 
iMerchants, what is a vertical marketplace. The Asian Internet market is relatively 
new, so for many Internet companies such as Tom.com, it's a matter of positioning 
themselves in the Internet space. Investors will have to start looking for companies 
with comparative advantages where an Internet presence not only makes sense, but 
also enhances the way business is conducted within an established market. 
Major Issues GEM Faces 
Lack of Condemnation on the Listed Firms' Non-compliance 
Transparency is key in corporate governance as it allows shareholders to use 
disclosed information to monitor the performance of the company's management. 
Investors will be able to use such information to make investment decision and 
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evaluate the performance of the management in major areas like risk management, 
financial performance and corporate strategy. This is consistent with the regulatory 
philosophy of GEM that emphasizes frequent and timely disclosure of information by 
GEM companies to enable investor to make informed investment decisions. 
However, there was not any condemnation from the regulatory board on the 
non-compliance of the listed firms. 
Attractiveness for Large Cap Issuers 
Throughout the year, the decisions by Sina.com and other large cap issuers to 
list on NASDAQ instead of GEM highlights OEM's difficulty in offering high 
valuation to large cap issuers. This is something that GEM has to bear with over the 
short term due to the lack of a developed market for technology and small cap stocks. 
Moreover, although the amended GEM rules will benefit GEM companies as a whole, 
certain requirements in the GEM listing rules are still much tighter than that of 
NASDAQ. Further changes should be made so that OEM's requirements are in line 
with that of NASDAQ's. By doing so, GEM will be in a much stronger position to 
lobby potential issuers as well as large cap companies which will help build OEM's 
reputation and liquidity. 
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Retail Investors Participation 
Many GEM stocks have thin trading turnover due to lack of interest from retail 
investors. This may be attributable to the absence of sufficient promotion to raise 
investors' awareness of GEM companies. Since many GEM companies are listed 
through share placements to institutional investors, company promotion to retail 
investors is seldom seen. Even if there were information and promotion on a GEM 
company, it would cease after the listing of the company. Many retail investors have 
limited understanding about a company's business, which makes it difficult to 
generate buying interest on the stock. As a result, a number of GEM companies that 
have sound earnings and solid growth, are being ignored in the retail market. Both 
the sponsor and GEM companies should provide an ongoing effort to keep investors 
informed. Nevertheless, after the burst of high-tech bubbles, retail investors tend to 
focus on companies that have proven earnings and solid growth. With many GEM 
stocks currently trading at steep discount to the listing prices, when the market 
sentiment improves, it may attract those retail punters who are looking for 
substantially undervalued GEM companies. 
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PRC Second Board 
The expected higher listings valuation and lower listing costs in the PRC 
second board is a concern to GEM. However, the impact on GEM as a whole would 
be minimal, given that the Chinese yuan is not fully convertible and GEM remains an 
attractive market for PRC companies to gain international exposure. The PRC 
second board would be a logical choice for those PRC-related GEM companies to 
seek dual listing status or to spin-off their PRC operations. 
Activities of Institutional Investors 
The activities of institutional investors will also determine the performance of 
future GEM deals. Unfortunately, institutional investors have been actively selling 
from the first day of trading. This is most evident in the case of GEM tech 
companies coming to the market through a pure placement issue instead of including 
a public offer tranche. Hongkong.com, iMerchants and Syscan Technology 
conducted share placements to institutional investors who sold from day one of 
trading. In order to entice quality companies to list on GEM, rather than turn only to 
Nasdaq, institutional investors need to add depth to the local tech sector by 
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understanding businesses and standing firm on their ethos of long term investment 
strategies. 
GEI - A Good Proxy of GEM's Performance? 
Growth Enterprise Index (GEI) was introduced on March 20, 2000 to provide 
investors with a benchmark indicator to assess the movement of the Growth 
Enterprise Market. Due to the limited number of listed companies and their short 
operating history, the GEM board is not ready to have its own indices for different 
industries. Although GEI reflects GEM's performance, GEI may not be an accurate 
proxy because 6 companies dominate around 60% of the market value. Based on 
year-end closing prices, GEM has a total market cap of about HK$71.0 billion. 
AcrossAsia Multimedia (8061) has replaced tom.com (8001) as the largest GEM 
company in terms of market cap. AcrossAsia accounts for 22.5% of the total GEM 
market cap, while tom.com has a 13.0% share of the market. Phoenix Satellite TV 
(8002) is the next largest, which has a 12.4% share of the total market cap, followed 
by Sunevision (8008), which accounts for 10.6%. Henderson Cyber (8023) is the sixth 
largest GEM company, accounting for 5.7% of the total market value. 
GEI is a good reference of GEM's performance but the lack of a broad 
49 
company base and the heavy concentration in the technology sector limits the index's 
representation in the interim. By the end of year 2000, GEM has a total of 54 
companies, of which approximately 70% are in the IT and Internet sectors. As more 
new GEM listings come to the market and the type of companies increase in diversity, 
the GEI index will become a better reflection of the market's performance. 
Discussing Conclusion for Qualitative Studies 
On the performance of GEM over the past year, a number of senior local securities 
regulators said the GEM board has already achieved its target of providing a financing 
channel for growth companies. However, there is more than that to achieve. GEM 
has a potential to become a NASDAQ type market for Hong Kong over time, given 
Hong Kong's strong infrastructure and the vast quantity of high growth companies in 
the Greater China region. To achieve this goal, GEM needs (1) a competitive 
regulatory system, (2) high transparency from GEM companies, (3) market making 
activities to enhance liquidity, (4) active investors participation, and (5) marketing and 
promotion to potential issuers. It may lake several years for GEM to mature but if 
GEM proceeds with these 5 points in hand, it will be on the right direction to 
becoming the exciting capital market exchange as the original objective. 
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